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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Background: In 1997, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) reviewed evidence of the effectiveness of 
HIV prevention programs for injection drug users (IDUs) and recommended that three types of 
interventions be implemented to prevent transmission of HIV among IDUs: 1) community-based 
outreach, 2) expanded syringe access (including needle exchange programs [NEP] and pharmacy sales), 
and 3) drug treatment. Progress on increasing the acceptance and feasibility of implementing these 
programs has been made at the national level, but their implementation has been varied at the local level. 
 
Objective:  To study the acceptance and implementation of the three interventions by communities and 
to identify the factors that contributed to the success or failure of communities to implement these 
programs on the local level. 
 
Methods:  Forty-three in-depth qualitative interviews were conducted with key informants in six U.S. 
cities. Informants included AIDS prevention providers, political leaders, activists, substance abuse and 
AIDS researchers, health department directors, and law enforcement officials. Cities were classified 
according to when they initiated interventions as 1) early adopters, 2) middle adopters, and 3) late or 
never adopters. 
 
Results:  Conditions that facilitated or deterred the adoption of interventions were identified. Coalition 
building and community consultation were key to the acceptance and sustainability of new interventions.  
Leadership from politicians, public health officials, and program directors provided necessary authority, 
legitimacy, and access to resources. Grassroots activists took initiative and risks in the face of 
opposition, but often lacked the resources to sustain their efforts.  Researchers played an important role 
in initiating interventions and legitimizing them by providing access to the scientific information 
supporting their safety and effectiveness. Successful implementers worked with or avoided the 
opposition rather than creating polarized positions. Changes in funding and structure of publicly 
supported drug treatment programs have limited the implementation of new programs. Lack of 
leadership in the political and public health sectors, and, indeed, fear of adopting or even discussing 
needle exchange because of perceived political opposition, were the biggest barriers to implementation 
of syringe exchange programs. 
 
Conclusion:  Understanding the conditions under which communities accept and implement 
interventions can help guide effective strategies to foster the implementation of these interventions in 
areas where programs do not currently exist.  
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BACKGROUND 
 
 
In 1997, the NIH Consensus Development Conference reviewed evidence of the effectiveness of HIV 
prevention programs for injection drug users (IDUs) and recommended that three types of programs be 
implemented: 1) community-based outreach, 2) expanded syringe access (including needle exchange 
programs (NEP) and pharmacy sales), and 3) drug treatment (NIH, 1997).  Communities have varied 
widely in the extent to which they have implemented these interventions.  
 
Progress on increasing the acceptance and feasibility of implementing HIV prevention programs for 
IDUs has been made at the national level through the use of consensus-building venues that bring 
together diverse stakeholders such as conferences and task forces (Joint Statement, 1999; National 
Association of State Controlled Substance Authorities, 2000; Burris, 2001).  However, progress in 
implementing these interventions at the local level has been varied.  In many areas interventions for 
IDUs have never been initiated. 
 
The purpose of this qualitative research was to study how communities chose whether or not to 
implement the three interventions in six US cities, and identify the factors related to the success or 
failure of attempts to implement them.  
 
 
METHODS 
 
 
Sampling Plan 
We used diffusion of innovations theory (Rogers, 1982) as our primary theoretical framework for 
selecting the cities. Diffusion of innovation theory supports the classification of communities into “early 
adopters,” “middle adopters,” and “late” or “never adopters.” 
 
Because drug treatment and outreach programs are diffuse in their funding and staffing, there was no 
single national database that described their implementation across cities. However, a national survey of 
syringe programs by city has been conducted (Paone, Des Jarlais, Clark and Shi, 1996), and using these 
data we divided cities into three categories of early, middle or late/never adopters based on the year they 
initiated NEPs.  In addition, geographical location and AIDS incidence rates were also taken into 
account to insure diversity.  We selected six cities: Seattle, Baltimore, Detroit, Miami, Newark, and 
Memphis. Seattle and Baltimore were early adopters; Detroit was a middle adopter, and Miami, Newark 
and Memphis were late or never adopters.  
 
A preliminary list of key informants in each city included public health officials (e.g., state AIDS 
directors, local health directors), HIV prevention providers, substance abuse researchers, AIDS service 
organizations (ASOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), activists, political leaders (including 
mayors, governors, and any relevant legislators), and law enforcement officials.  In each city we 
attempted to interview two informants knowledgeable about each intervention for a total of six 
interviews per city.  One of the two informants represented an institutional perspective, such as the city 
government, public health department, or research institution.  The other informant represented a 
community perspective, and included community leaders, activists, or service providers from CBOs.  In 
addition, in cities which had opposition movements to any of the interventions, we attempted to 
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interview opposition leaders. However, despite much effort, we were not successful in identifying 
opposition leaders willing to be interviewed for this study.   
 
 
Data Collection 
From December 2000 through March 2001, 43 telephone interviews were conducted with public health 
officials, researchers, policy makers, activists and providers in six cities. There were 14 interviews about 
NEPs, 11 about drug treatment, and 18 about outreach.  Interviews were tape recorded and transcribed.  
Prior to the interview, informants were sent a consent form and interview guide by fax or e-mail. 
 
The goal of the interviews was to elicit different factors that might have influenced whether or not a 
community implemented any or all of the three NIH recommended HIV interventions. While there was 
uniformity in the core interview questions, capturing the diversity of experience was considered more 
important than uniformity in the administration of the interviews.  Therefore interviews were 
individually tailored based on the particular intervention and the participants’ experiences. Interviewers 
had extensive experience in qualitative interviewing and research methods. 
 
No opposition interviews were conducted, despite many hours of staff time spent attempting to arrange 
interviews with individuals who opposed NEPs, expansion of drug treatment, or outreach. Other than an 
e-mail message from a governor’s aide opposed to NEPs, we were not successful in interviewing or 
receiving statements from representatives with opposing viewpoints. Several people opposed to NEP 
agreed to be interviewed but repeatedly canceled or were not at the specified telephone number at the 
agreed upon time. Staff made at least four more attempts to reschedule “no-shows,” but never received a 
reply from the phone messages, the e-mails, or the faxes that were sent.  
 
Naturally, in cities where programs did not exist, it was not always possible to find people to talk about 
why those interventions did not exist. On the other hand, in cities that responded early in the epidemic to 
the threat of HIV to IDUs and developed many “cutting edge interventions,” people were eager to 
discuss their programs and to refer us to other potential interviewees. These data collection limitations 
resulted in some sections of this report having more data than others. 
 
Seven interviews were conducted in Baltimore. Three were about NEPs, two were about drug treatment 
and two about outreach. Three were with government officials, and four were with community 
representatives.  
 
Eight interviews were conducted in Detroit. Two were about needle exchange, two about drug treatment, 
and four were about outreach. Four were with community representatives and four were with 
government officials. One respondent was interviewed about both outreach and drug treatment.  
 
Five interviews were conducted in Memphis.  Two were related to drug treatment and the other three to 
outreach. Two were with government representatives and three were with community members. There 
were no interviews in Memphis about NEPs. While there were second hand reports of an underground 
NEP in Memphis, none of the respondents were able to place us in contact with anyone with first hand 
knowledge of this NEP.  None of the respondents were able to identify anyone who had any plans to 
initiate a NEP in the future.  Respondents were also unable to identify any organized opposition to NEP.  
There was a general consensus that the community was too conservative to accept the intervention and 
as such it simply remained untried.  Because we felt it was important to depict a NEP within a 
conservative environment such as Tennessee, we conducted an interview with a community based NEP 
provider in Nashville.  This provider operated the only NEP in Nashville, and received no funding or 
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support from anyone within the city government or public health department. He was not able to any 
provide us with another respondent who could speak about NEP in Nashville. 
 
Seven interviews were conducted in Miami. Three interviews were conducted focusing on outreach 
efforts among IDUs, two on needle exchange and two covering drug treatment.  There was some overlap 
among the three areas of concentration during the interviews since HIV prevention efforts among drug 
users often encompass multiple methods.  Two interviews were with government officials, and the other 
five were with community representatives. 
 
Eight interviews were conducted in Newark, three about needle exchange, one about drug treatment, and 
four about outreach.  The interviews were equally divided between government and community 
representatives. Repeated attempts were made to interview city council members in Newark who were 
known to be in opposition to needle exchange. We were not granted any interviews. Other NEP 
opponents refused to participate. However, community members were eager to speak with us. We were 
successful obtaining interviews from government and health department officials about outreach and 
drug treatment. 
 
Seven interviews were conducted in Seattle. Three were about NEPs, two about drug treatment, and two 
about outreach. Four were with government representatives and three with community representatives. 
 
Data Analysis 
We analyzed data collected from various sources (interviews, literature reviews, archival information, 
etc.) using a grounded theory analytical approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1994).  
Through an iterative process of reading the data, creating theoretical memos, and rereading the data we 
developed case studies (Stake, 1995) describing the implementation, both successful and unsuccessful, 
of each intervention in each city.  From these case studies we identified emergent themes on the 
implementation of these interventions in each city and across cities. We then compared and contrasted 
these findings within and across data sources to expand, clarify, and refine emergent findings. Through 
the constant comparison across data sources we integrated findings from the various data sources (i.e., 
triangulated the data) to derive a more complete and accurate interpretation of our findings (Fielding & 
Fielding, 1986). 
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FINDINGS 
 
 
1. Coalition building and community consultation are a key to the acceptance and sustainability 
of new interventions. 
 
Collaborations between local authorities, service providers, researchers and grass roots activists were 
key to the success and sustainability of many interventions.  These collaborations blended the strengths 
of each group: the power and resources of the authorities, the experience and community presence of the 
service providers, and the determination and quick response of the grassroots activists.  The drawback of 
collaborations was their sometimes time-consuming development and decision-making processes.  Other 
less purely collaborative efforts often incorporated community consultation as a means to avoid public 
opposition and to develop buy in.  In two cities with NEPs, officials underwent laborious processes of 
gaining community support through public meetings and consultations with community members.  Both 
were able to implement programs with relatively little conflict, but some providers complained about the 
amount of time this process took. The HIV Prevention Planning Councils instituted by the Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention have mandated a certain level of collaboration.  In some cities where 
IDUs and former IDUs were active on these councils, they lobbied to prioritize and fund interventions 
for drug users.    
 
 
2. Leadership from politicians, public health officials, and program directors provides authority, 
legitimacy and access to resources 
 
Both in cities where interventions were initiated entirely by high ranking government officials and those 
in which grassroots groups collaborated with local authorities, the presence and leadership of these 
individuals was key to the success of the interventions.  Even in those areas where authorities were 
lobbied for their tacit approval rather than public support, gaining their approval was seen as crucial.  
One respondent suggested that organizers must “know how power works in your city, and work with it.”  
The most obvious benefits of supportive leadership from local authorities were access to financial 
resources for the interventions and, in the case of NEP, reduced threat of criminal prosecution. These 
officials also had access to large audiences to promote their message and to the resources needed to 
lobby for such interventions.  
 
When gaining the support of public officials many respondents found that working with sympathetic 
leaders “on the inside” was the best strategy.  These leaders knew how to best frame the interventions 
for their peers. One mayor presented NEP and drug treatment efforts as “cost saving measures” to 
legislators and as “crime prevention measures” to law enforcement officials.  When the activists in one 
city wanted the city council to approve the NEP, they had city council members from other cities that 
had recently supported similar initiatives flown in to speak to the council.  Their initiative was 
successful. Conversely, a presentation to another city council by activists from a neighboring city was 
unsuccessful.  The council members perceived them as outsiders with a specific political agenda that did 
not speak to their community’s interests. 
 
Within collaborations the support of local authorities can bring in more “middle of the road” players.  
The costs of working with local authorities were their sensitivity to public opinion, reluctance to risk 
public opposition, and the long amount of time required to work through official bureaucracies. 
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3. Grassroots activists take initiative and risks in the face of opposition but often lack the 
resources to sustain their efforts 
 
Grassroots activists have initiated intervention for IDUs in many cities.  They have come from  political 
activist groups fighting HIV and CBOs working in highly impacted communities.  The strength of the 
grassroots activists is their willingness to go against “the system” and public opposition.  In the case of 
NEP this includes a willingness to risk arrest.  The weaknesses are their lack of access to resources and 
their vulnerability to criminal prosecution.  Generally, the greater the access to resources that activists 
had from the beginning or were able to develop, and the more they were able to align with community 
institutions, the more sustained success they had.  In one NEP city, AIDS activists immediately 
developed collaborations with the health department, and through this association developed further 
relationships with the mayor and law enforcement agencies.  In the Southern cities where we collected 
data, activists were working inside existing CBOs serving the affected areas.  They continued to frame 
the interventions for IDUs within that context, that is, as services provided to their disenfranchised 
communities.  In two of our cities without NEPs, grassroots efforts to conduct NEP have repeatedly 
started and disappeared.  They have not been able to sustain their efforts.   
 
 
4. Research plays a role in initiating and legitimizing interventions. 
 
In many cities proponents used research findings about the spread of HIV among IDUs and the 
effectiveness of various interventions to create initial “buy in” and/or continue to defend their work.  
Several outreach programs and NEPs were begun in whole or in part as research demonstration projects.  
Some activist initiated interventions included research evaluations in their programs to gain legitimacy 
among local authorities and other services providers.     
 
Researchers have access to funds and resources not available to many grassroots organizations.  At the 
same time they are not necessarily as sensitive to public opinion as local authorities might be.   Many 
researchers have initiated and/or maintained interventions for IDUs.  The initiation of some federal 
AIDS research demonstration grants put a new kind of professional in day-to-day contact with IDUs.  
They were public health workers, ethnographers, and epidemiologists rather than law enforcement or 
drug treatment staff.  They came without the agendas of recovery or criminal prosecution, but with a 
desire to understand drug use and to stop the spread of HIV transmission.  In one city with early 
outreach to IDUs, it was the federally funded ethnographers who became the first outreach workers.  In 
several cities research staff have been involved in many different roles.    
 
However, researchers are governed by local, state, and/or federal restrictions and the constraints of their 
own research institutions particularly regarding NEPs.  Most were unable to use any of their funding to 
support or implement NEPs and could only evaluate existing programs.  In addition, because researchers 
have the resources and ability to work independently in the community, it is entirely up to individual 
researchers whether they will build collaborations and ties to local service providers and community 
members. Failure to do so can lead to local opposition and “turf” struggles between researchers and the 
community. Finally, research funding always has finite duration. Research projects often end abruptly, 
because continuation of services is dependent on the next research grant getting funded. One of the cities 
studied has had a vigorous research program for HIV prevention among IDUs that, when funded, 
provided vital outreach services for the city.  However, when research funding for a particular initiative 
ends, the outreach program ends with it. 
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5. Successful implementers worked with or avoided the opposition rather than adopting 
polarized positions. 
 
Repeatedly respondents discussed the importance of continuing to work with the opposition rather than 
taking an aggressive approach.  Successful groups did not try to work with extreme opposition groups 
with whom they had no hope of ever coming to agreement.  Rather they worked carefully with “fence 
sitters” or individuals, who while they might be personally opposed, could be convinced not to block the 
progress of the intervention.  In order to keep a continual dialogue open with these individuals, 
successful groups did not force them to take a stance on the intervention(s) that they might not be able to 
back down from later.  They tried to avoid polarization at all costs.  In one city, the AIDS office at the 
local health department made many presentations and gave updates to the city council and health 
department leaders on NEP and outreach long before asking them to make a decision on proceeding with 
the interventions. One respondent said they wore down the internal opposition with information and 
persistence. The director of the NEP in another city decided it was better to not accept their first grant 
award rather than risk having the award debated in the city council.  He knew they could gain tacit 
approval from officials who would never be willing to take a public position supporting needle 
exchange.   Several programs talked about avoiding press coverage and keeping a low profile so that 
they would not encourage public opposition.  Conversely in one state where NEPs are still illegal, one 
initial organizing effort around NEP was a drive to have local city councils pass ordinances supporting 
NEP.  The effort called for the municipal authorities to take a public stance on a controversial service 
that was not yet being provided in their city.  The effort failed in the city we studied.        
 
 
6. Changes in funding and structure of publicly supported drug treatment have limited the 
implementation of new programs. 
 
In a few cities the local authority responsible for providing drug treatment services was shifted from one 
department to another during the reorganization of state and county health departments in the 1990’s.  
This was described both at the county and state levels.  Invariably the move was described as a bad one.  
Drug treatment leaders felt the programs were transferred into departments where “no one wanted 
them.” The new departments had little knowledge and/or interest in drug treatment programs.  Grants 
and new initiatives dwindled.  In addition, the funding structures for drug treatment changed in most 
states during the 1990’s because of managed care.  Many programs changed from categorical funding to 
fee-for-services. Staff reported that they had less funding under the new structures and that new 
programs were more difficult to start. 
 
 
7. Sensitivity to the political and cultural norms of the region is key  
 
It was clear that different strategies had to be employed in different locales.  One city with a progressive 
history was ripe for a collaborative effort.  There were strong ties already existing between the health 
department, drug treatment, and HIV prevention providers.  Public health workers in the city prided 
themselves on being “cutting edge.” When NEP was bogged down in the collaborative process, local 
activists went ahead and started the program.  They were politically savvy, working with authorities 
from the start, managing their press coverage and were received positively by the community as a 
whole.  In “the buckle of the Bible belt” very different implementation strategies were employed. 
Successful groups avoided public presentations and relied on their reputations as community-based 
service providers.  They purposefully did not represent interventions to IDUs as a political cause.  They 
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worked closely with local religious communities to gain community support.  In the case of the NEP 
they did not seek political approval and did not look for active collaborations with other organizations.  
They worked only to educate other services providers and to nullify public opposition rather than to gain 
public support. 
 
 
8. Fear of discussing needle exchange and lack of leadership are the biggest barriers to 
implementation 
 
The respondents in cities that had no needle exchange and in the historical accounts of other cities 
before they implemented their NEPs all expressed a fear of even discussing needle exchange as one of 
the primary barriers to its implementation.  Often when asked to describe the most powerful opposition 
to NEP in their cities, respondents could only identify a general sense of trepidation and sense that “it 
could never be done here.”  Fears cited were wide-ranging, some based in reality and others in 
conjecture.  Public health workers feared losing their jobs, elected officials feared losing their 
constituencies, activists feared being arrested and having their property seized.  Many respondents 
feared the loss of existing funding for other programs for drug users or backlash in the community, 
including charges of genocide by minority groups. 
 
It is difficult to think of another public health intervention that has generated as much fear as NEP and 
related “harm reduction” interventions.  The moral stigma related to drug use and addiction in the U.S. is 
pervasive and in some communities has trumped the arguments for NEP cost effectiveness and public 
health benefit. In the political climate of the U.S. in which the “War on Drugs” takes a harsh and 
unrelenting punitive stance toward drug use and few politicians are willing to risk being considered 
“coddling” or “soft” on drug users, many public health officials are unsure of the wisdom of considering 
–– or their mandate to consider –– any intervention which provided assistance to drug users. The lack of 
leadership from the federal government in support of needle exchange also feed into this fear.  
 
These fears created an inertia around implementation that was greater barrier than any organized 
opposition to these programs.  In cities which had overcome this initial inertia it was the presence of one 
or two leaders, especially those with some access to local power and resources that had overcome this 
barrier.  If there were leaders willing to implement the programs or work with local activists to 
implement the programs despite the prevailing “wisdom“ of dire results they could effectively change 
the debate.  Once programs were initiated many fears were simply proven unfounded.  In several cities 
politicians found there was actually much more public support for NEP than they could have imagined, 
and the popular press was largely positive.  Others found community response was benign, or that with a 
little bit of coalition building and willingness to listen to community concerns they could be easily 
allayed.  Once the programs are begun, and what was anathema has become reality, the nature of the 
debate changes from “should we or should we not have an NEP” which allows fears both real and 
imagined to overwhelm anticipated benefits, to “how should we run the NEP to best respond to any of 
the actual problems we are encountering.”  In several cities respondents reported using this strategy, 
implementing the NEP first, with relatively little fanfare and then initiating or responding to public 
debate.  However, in cities in which no local leader arose to take on the initial implementation the fears 
about the program effectively blocked its implementation. 
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COMMUNITY ACCEPTANCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
 
Because of limited resources, this study was confined to community acceptance of HIV prevention for 
injecting drug users in the United States.  In some countries, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, 
HIV transmission among IDUs has been very limited, while in other countries have experienced 
extremely rapid transmission of HIV among IDUs (Stimson, et al. 1998; Des Jarlais & Friedman, 1998).  
Currently, rapid transmission of HIV is occurring in many countries in Asia and Eastern Europe 
(UNAIDS/WHO 2001). A study of factors influencing community acceptance of HIV prevention for 
IDUs in different countries would necessarily be considerably more complex than the present study of 
community acceptance in the United States.  It would need to include consideration of cultural 
traditions, economic development, systems of government, the local history of illicit drug use, and the 
degree of stigmatization of HIV/AIDS among other comparative factors.  Some data are already 
available from the “Rapid Assessments” that have been done in many cities throughout the world 
(WHO, 1998), but further work is needed. The results of such an international study could be extremely 
helpful in worldwide efforts to control the pandemic of HIV infection.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
Case Studies 
 
Our results are presented in a series of case studies on each city.  Each case study includes the histories 
of the development of outreach, drug treatment and needle exchange interventions in that city.   
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BALTIMORE 
 
 
City Summary 
 
Over the last decade substance use and HIV have exploded in Baltimore, as a top official explains, 
 
 “Baltimore is hugely decimated by substance abuse.  It is like the largest problem facing this 
city…there is no controversy over the need for more drug treatment…everybody – conservative 
legislators, to the Governor, all say that we need more drug treatment…one of the issues that 
we're increasing drug treatment for is to deal with AIDS.” 
 
In 1995, 37% of male arrestees and 48% of female arrestees tested positive for opiates in Baltimore, the 
highest rate of heroin use ever found in the US.  In 1999, more Baltimore residents died of drug 
overdose than of homicide.  In 1999, AIDS was the leading cause of death among people aged 25-44 
and injection drug use accounted for 60% of the new AIDS cases (Drug Strategies 2000).  
 
Despite these overwhelming statistics, Baltimore has a well-developed prevention plan to combat the 
combined epidemics of injection drug use and HIV.  Currently, Baltimore has over 7,500 free drug 
treatment slots for the uninsured, a drug treatment budget of $42 million and a NEP that serves 
approximately 14,000 IDUs.  Since the NEP began in August of 1994, approximately 1,400 IDUs have 
sought drug treatment through referrals from the program.  By 2002, the goal of Baltimore’s Department 
of Health (DOH) is to provide “drug treatment on request,” a plan that will allow drug users to be 
admitted into treatment within twenty-four hours of his or her request or court order.  
 
Outreach 
 
In the mid 1980s, officials from a federal agency contacted the Maryland State Department of Health 
(DOH) about funds available to address the emerging problem of HIV transmission among IDUs. Based 
on the heroin epidemic in Baltimore, the State DOH contacted the city DOH about implementing an 
HIV prevention intervention in Baltimore. A meeting was set up between the leading outreach 
organization in Baltimore, the DOH and the State DOH. The three parties decided street outreach was 
the most appropriate intervention because they wanted to start reaching and educating people 
immediately.  The city agreed to use their state funding for this project. They contracted with the CBO 
to have staff (health educators and community health outreach workers [CHOWs] who were themselves 
recovering addicts) provide street outreach. The CBO was not, however, funded for bleach distribution 
since the federal agency and the state DOH prohibited it because they believed that it promoted drug 
use. The DOH and the CBO both thought bleach distribution was an important component. The CBO 
sought other funding to pay for bleach and began distributing bleach kits, which included bleach, 
syringe cleaning instructions, condoms, and referrals. 
 
In the late 1980s, a few years after the intervention began, the outreach program started to expand. The 
DOH added a medical van to address the health needs of IDUs as well as non-drug users. The medical 
van also went out at night to target sex workers. This expansion served as another way to build greater 
acceptance of outreach, showing that it benefited others as well as IDUs. In the late 1980s a national 
AIDS researcher contacted the CBO to participate in a three-city federal study of outreach. As part of 
this study, the CBO expanded their outreach and began to distribute bleach but only in the areas funded 
by research. 
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The mayor, the Health commissioner and the Police Commissioner were all supportive of street outreach 
to IDUs. Support from the police proved particularly essential to the success of this program. Initially 
outreach workers had problems with the police, but they were resolved quickly once they were brought 
to the attention of higher-ranking officers.  
 
In order to receive the support of politicians and the community, presentations were made to the city 
council. These presentations not only educated city council members but also allowed them to pass the 
information on to their constituencies. Community forums were also held where representatives from the 
DOH presented to various neighborhood associations.  Finally, as a requirement of federal funding, drug 
treatment staff was trained about HIV.  
 
For the most part, community education met with little hostility. The distribution of bleach was an issue 
early on, but these community forums explained the need for such a measure. These forums also gave 
educators the opportunity to explain that HIV was a disease being transmitted beyond IDUs infecting 
non-drug-using sex partners and children. The delivery of this message was crucial in shifting 
community attitudes about AIDS, in gaining broad community support and explaining the rationale for 
bleach distribution.  As a result, no major opposition was faced. 
 
Drug Treatment 
 
In the mid 1990s, the mayor began to emphasize the need for the expansion of drug treatment because of 
the devastating effects that both drug use and HIV were having on many residents. The mayor increased 
the DOH’s funding for drug treatment and shifted federal grant funds from other city agencies into drug 
treatment. In 1995, the oversight of drug treatment was shifted from the DOH to Substance Abuse 
Systems so that the expansion of treatment could be guided by a substance abuse-specific agency.  
 
With the help of the mayor, city council, faith leaders, community members and the media, substance 
use became a major priority for the city.  Marketed as a way to reduce crime and promote public safety, 
increasing drug treatment funding faced no opposition.  This does not however mean that there was no 
need for advocacy as one interviewee explained, 
 
“Now, it’s much easier for them to say, ‘Yes it’s a big problem, we need to do something about 
it.’ It’s been harder to get them to give the funding…a lot of what I do is advocate for it.  And 
there are now a lot of people advocating for it.” 
 
The interviewee emphasized two key components in building a case for drug treatment: establishing the 
appropriate treatment system while holding it accountable and being willing to get involved politically.  
The interviewee stated 
 
“We hold all our treatment programs very tightly accountable…We have all their data—
retention rates, urinalysis positives, the arrest records of their clients in treatment…And 
programs that aren’t doing so well get reprimanded. They have to respond very quickly about 
what they’re going to do to improve. If a program has a really good result, we require or 
recommend that other treatment programs do the same things…So it’s been a lot of building 
accountability of our treatment programs  so that we can use that data with politicians and with 
the public and say, ‘Hey, look, as an example in our methadone and residential treatment 
programs less than 5% of people in treatment are arrested during treatment.’” 
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Through city, state, and federal funding, the city has almost tripled drug treatment funding since 1997.  
By the end of fiscal year 2000, the budget for drug treatment grew from $16 million to $42 million.  
This funding explosion resulted in an additional 3,400 free drug treatment slots, growing from 4,000 to 
7,400, that provides treatment for an estimated 23,000 uninsured drug users.  
 
Efforts have been made to connect drug treatment slots to specific programs whenever possible.  For 
example, within the NEP there are 200 “dedicated” drug treatment slots. Although the increased amount 
of funding and the additional number of slots are not directly proportional to the vast number of drug 
users in need of treatment in Baltimore, the city government continues to make drug treatment a funding 
priority and seeks more effective and more expensive forms of drug treatment, including residential 
treatment. While this increase in funding for drug treatment was in response to what the interviewee 
described as “…the whole panoply of the consequences of substance abuse…crime, economics, school, 
and certainly health”, the goal is to provide “treatment on request” or treatment required by court order 
by 2002. “Treatment on request” refers to the city’s policy of providing drug users with treatment within 
twenty-four hours of their request or court order.  
 
Needle Exchange 
 
In 1988, the mayor began to shift his drug policy focus from criminal justice to public health. As AIDS 
began to spread rapidly through Baltimore, primarily among IDUs, the mayor recognized that 
distributing bleach and educating drug users about behavior change was not sufficient. The mayor and 
his staff investigated HIV prevention interventions for IDUs in other cities and countries. After 
gathering data on NEPs, the mayor was convinced that this intervention needed to be implemented in 
Baltimore. In the following year, the mayor found sponsors for the needle exchange legislation and the 
first needle exchange bill was brought to committee.  
 
The first attempt to legalize NEPs in Baltimore was not a success, but the mayor and his staff were 
determined to get legislation passed. They identified their opposition as being primarily the religious 
community and law enforcement, and lobbied them heavily over the next year. The Health 
commissioner and the mayor made lobbying for this legislation their full time job, talking about NEPs 
everywhere they went. The language they chose was crucial in the acceptance or rejection of NEPs. The 
mayor and the health commissioner diversified their approach depending on their audience. For state 
legislators NEPs were offered as cost saving measures, and for law enforcement officials NEPs were 
presented as a crime reduction intervention. They always maintained the same two points, however: 
NEPs were a public health measure and they would be reevaluated in three years. While church groups 
and law enforcement were openly lobbied, the Governor’s Secretary of Health was quietly lobbying the 
Governor on this issue. The Secretary knew that it was not necessary or likely that the Governor would 
publicly support a NEP, but knew it was key that he did not publicly oppose it. After over a year of 
lobbying law enforcement, churches and the Governor, the needle exchange bill was approved by one 
vote in 1994. 
 
Then the DOH issued a “request for programs” to CBOs to apply to operate a NEP. In order to be 
approved, the programs had to have unanimous support from their community associations. The purpose 
of this strategy was to avoid a “Not In My Backyard (NIMBY)” community response. The legislation 
included specific evaluation requirements, that is, every syringe exchanged over the next three years had 
to be bar coded, tracked and tested for HIV. In 1997, after the evaluation found NEPs helpful in 
decreasing HIV, the NEPs bill passed overwhelmingly in both the House and Senate and it became a 
permanent law. 
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DETROIT 
 
 
City Summary 
 
“We were really careful not to put the Mayor in an untenable position, which would force him 
not to do the right thing. It was not just 'You get out there, you be the front person talking about 
syringes and all that.’  We were real careful not to put him in a position that would make people 
around him say, ‘Fool, do you want to lose the election if you decide to run again…’  So we did 
some harm reduction around him, and around our health officer and everything.  We made sure 
that everything could be backed up by the facts.  We tried to make sure to anticipate if there was 
going to be any hysteria, and get out there with people who had less to lose...” 
 
Surveillance data estimates that there are over 35,000 IDUs residing in the greater Detroit area, with 
over 80% living in Detroit.  Heroin deaths have increased by 24% in both 1999 and 2000, following a 
19% increase in both 1996 and 1997. By the end of 2000, it is estimated there will be twice as many 
heroin deaths as there were in 1996. Heroin purity is at its highest level and prices remain at low levels. 
Cocaine deaths in Detroit increased by more than 18% in 2000. More than six out of every ten heroin 
treatment admissions statewide occurred in Detroit in fiscal year 2000 (Calkins 2000). It is estimated 
that over 2,500 IDUs are living with HIV/AIDS. Surveillance data shows that HIV infection rates 
among IDUs decreased from 250 per year in 1994 to approximately 200 per year in 1997. IDUs, 
including men who have sex with men (MSMs) IDUs, and heterosexuals with IDU sexual partners make 
up a third of people living with AIDS in Detroit (Region 1 HIV Community Prevention Planning Group, 
2000). 
 
Outreach 
 
HIV outreach to IDUs was initially funded in 1988 by a federal grant to conduct outreach in emergency 
rooms and detox programs. A recovering addict was hired to do outreach in these venues. Several 
respondents said that outreach was successful because of his total commitment to the drug using 
community, and that the indigenous outreach model was widely accepted and later funded by the state 
and the local health department (LHD) and implemented in other community venues by culturally-
specific CBOs. 
 
Using federal funds, one CBO opened a storefront in 1989 to conduct HIV counseling and testing 
(C&T) and to provide services in the jails. They also had mobile services, a “one-stop-shop” and an 
outreach and pre treatment program (OPT).  OPT consisted of two outreach workers who did outreach at 
bars, parks and to parents at a local Head Start program. The services were readily accepted by the 
community and fully utilized. Since many neighborhoods in Detroit do not have adequate public 
transportation, the mobile services were particularly needed.  
 
There was little opposition to outreach partly because there were not many existing services for drug 
users. Drug users were grateful for any attention paid to the issue. Detroit built strong coalitions between 
city departments and CBOs. The Health Department worked well with the CBOs and had many 
meetings to plan outreach programs. Integrating AIDS prevention services wherever possible was a goal 
from the very beginning. Fifteen to 22 outreach teams work in the city and all the CHOWS get together 
once a month to share strategies, coordinate efforts, and plan joint activities.  
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Most of the outreach respondents seemed remarkably upbeat about the current outreach services in 
Detroit. One respondent had moved away and gone back to Detroit to consult for the local health 
department, and this person had nothing negative to say about the health department or the services, only 
that “Detroit itself is a bleak, rusty, dying, aging inner city with little revitalization or gentrification 
succeeding.”  People felt that they did not face huge barriers in order to implement and conduct outreach 
services. However, respondents thought that the high turn over of executive directors at the CBOs and of 
administrative staff in various city departments caused continuity problems, and as a consequence a loss 
of funding and services. 
 
Drug Treatment 
 
IDUs wanting to enter drug treatment must go through the city’s central admitting and enrolling system 
called Central Diagnostic Referral Services (CDRS), which is administered by the Bureau of Substance 
Abuse Services. Detroit considers itself a model for treatment-on-demand because clients can often 
receive treatment services the same day that they present at the downtown CDRS center.  However, if 
clients go to their neighborhood treatment clinic, they cannot be enrolled or receive services until they 
have gone through the “Hub” at CDRS. This was seen as a barrier for IDUs who do not follow-up and 
go to CDRS. If they do make it downtown they often have to wait on line.  
 
“If they walk in today, we have to turn them away. When people get there, they are being served 
well, but the problem is for addicts to get themselves to that place where years ago it was much 
more community-based when a patient in their own neighborhood knew where the clinics were and 
the families all knew where the clinics are we could simply take them right into the clinic. If they 
walk in today, we have to turn them away…getting them to the Hub is not always the best for 
them.” 
 
The “Hub” is now able to process everyone who shows up in the morning as compared to a few years 
ago when people where sent away after waiting on line for many hours. Clients enrolled in one program 
do not have to go through the admitting procedures to receive services in 32 other programs in the 
system as long as they are receiving the same level of care.  That is, if an IDU was initially evaluated for 
outpatient treatment, and then the clinic thought that they should be in a residential program, they may 
have to go back and be re-evaluated. Clinics repeat the intake process because they do not receive the 
paperwork from CDRS for a week or so and do not collect the information that the clinics feel they 
need.  
 
Several outreach staff have worked both in AIDS prevention and in drug treatment for over 10 years. 
Many drug treatment programs have AIDS in-reach programs inside their centers, which includes HIV 
education and prevention to clients. Like many other cities, Detroit’s drug treatment services have been 
negatively impacted by the change to fee-for-service. Fee-for-services have also hurt CBOs ability to 
participate in regional and local HIV meetings. Contractors are “forced” to attend monthly meetings. 
 
I wish it was much more of a team approach to doing things but it is just disseminating 
information at those meetings. 
 
 
Most HIV prevention in drug treatment is centered on training for staff. All staff are required to attend a 
2-day HIV training. Staff are not paid to attend the training, and do not often take advantage of the other 
more specialized training because they are not paid to do so. For contractors to be in compliance, they 
must submit verification that staff attended the two-day HIV training.  Many staff felt that the 2-day 
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training could have taken place in 2 hours. There seems to be little evidence that AIDS prevention funds 
have been used in drug treatment beyond staff training. One provider said that he couldn’t remember 
any AIDS prevention funding opportunities.  
 
Needle Exchange 
 
Detroit implemented its NEP through a coalition of grassroots activists, community service providers, 
researchers, health department staff and key political figures. While it took almost five years to legalize 
NEPs, the volunteer activist exchange continued to provide syringes every week.   
 
In the early 1990’s a man started the exchange out of the trunk of his car in nearby Pontiac. Once the 
exchange became legalized, “he went away and no one has heard from him since”. There is not much 
known about him, and no one could even remember his name. They know that he approached the mayor 
of Detroit after about a year of conducting the NEP to request that he not get arrested. The mayor was 
impressed and asked the Health Department to “look into it” and made sure he never was arrested.  
 
Other activists joined this man and began collaborating with other CBOs, researchers, health department 
staff, and key political figures. The representatives from the LHD, although completely supportive of 
NEP, decided that their role should be to provide legitimacy and certification to the organizations that 
wanted to run NEPs. Local researchers joined the growing NEP coalition and utilized existing research 
and information from other NEPs around the country to develop a plan to gain the support of the City 
Council. Instead of having the NEP activists speak to them, the NEP coalition decided to ask the local 
ASO to give them $10,000 to fly “experts” to Detroit to present to the city council. At first the 
organization refused. One of the researchers involved in the coalition called the director to find out why 
they would not fund this plan. He invited the director to come out to observe the NEP. The ASO director 
was so impressed with what he saw that he gave the NEP coalition the funding they requested. They 
flew in a council member from New Haven who had initially been opposed to NEP, but had “seen the 
light.” So they had “like talking to like.” They brought in other prominent researchers to present findings 
from other studies. Researchers, in particular, seemed to understand that city council members were not 
going to be convinced, unless people with shared perspectives and concerns spoke with them. After that 
presentation, all of the council members supported the NEP. 
 
Then the coalition held a meeting with opponents and proponents together. They made it a point of the 
meeting to hear the concerns of the opponents respectfully, never discounting their concerns.    They 
then politically mapped out a strategy to gain the support of the Detroit Substance Abuse Committee. 
 
The Health Department was able to get a city attorney assigned to write the city’s position paper in favor 
of needle exchange.  This would be the beginning to drafting enabling legislation for NEPs in Detroit.  
CBOs, law enforcement, ASO, and City Council members were all involved. This group was careful to 
make sure that the individual activists who were running the NEP would still be able to do so after the 
legislation was passed. The enabling legislation was written in such way that agencies or individuals 
could be certified to do NEP. A non-profit status was not necessary. “An individual could provide 
syringes out of the back of their car.”  
 
The requirements for certification to conduct a NEP included the following: 1) At least one certified 
AIDS Pre/Post Test Counselor on site; 2) at least one person who could make drug treatment referrals 
but they did not have to be a drug treatment professional; 3) A relationship with a biohazard waste 
company for disposal of syringes; and finally 4) A $10 licensing fee. However, the city was never told 
how to collect this fee, so they never did. 
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Once the NEPs had begun there was some initial opposition in the faith community and among African 
American leaders and charges of genocide were made. The NEP coalition dealt with the opposition by 
keeping dialogue open and never disregarding their opinions. They held numerous community meetings 
and simply continued to listen to the opposition viewpoints.  They did not make changes in the NEP and 
eventually through this process, coalition members were able to get the opponents to agree to not come 
out against needle exchange. Respondents believed they were successful in this because of the attention 
the opposition concerns were given. The coalition always stressed that NEP was part of a larger 
comprehensive approach to meet the needs of IDUs. To this day there has not been any “backlash” about 
NEPs in Detroit.  
 
Respondents made the history sound simple, although it took almost five years to get NEP approved in 
Detroit. People got discouraged along the way.  But the model they developed was appropriate to Detroit 
and they followed it through.  Below is a description of the history of needle exchange from one of our 
government respondents.  Two other participants told the same history.  
 
When asked what was one of the keys to their success, one public official replied:  
 
“…the incredible amount of positive momentum that could happen when you have different 
branches, disciplines, all working together doing what they do best.  There were some things that 
the community did, that we probably would not have been able to accomplish, like getting the 
City Council that fired up, and motivated and all of that.  That is something that the community 
group did.  Quite honestly, I don't think that the community group would have been able to cause 
the legal department to sit down and work day after day after day on getting that ordinance re-
written, and getting the other ordinance written.  That's something that really took the 
movement, and the request of the health officer to get that done…And I think that that's what 
caused -- it really caused a lot of momentum, and caused it to move much quicker than most 
things move, when it requires, you know, ordinance changes and agreement between City 
Council, and Mayors, and the community and all of that.  And we kept each other informed and 
didn't step on each other's toes and really tried not to rain on each other's parades.” 
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MEMPHIS 
 
 
City Summary 
 
“We are the buckle of the Bible belt.  People are afraid to talk about condom distribution.” 
 
Memphis, which is located in Shelby County, has the majority of AIDS cases in Tennessee. In 2000 
Shelby County reported 4,410 HIV infections and 2,928 cumulative cases of AIDS. African Americans 
represented 23% of population and 50% of HIV cases. (Tennessee Department of Health, 2000; Shelby 
County Regional Advisory HIV Prevention Planning Group, 2000).  
 
Memphis was repeatedly described by respondents as “the buckle of the Bible belt”, where even handing 
out condoms was questioned because it might promote pre-marital sex.  Interventions for IDUs were 
reportedly unpopular with both the state legislature and the general public.  There are no HIV prevention 
interventions specifically targeting IDUs in Memphis, and no publicly subsidized methadone treatment. 
The local health department is small, with a generalized outreach and community education department 
that focuses primarily on bringing HIV C&T to the community.  Other services are contracted out to 
local CBOs.  HIV prevention planning has focused primarily on the African American community 
because of the disproportionate rates of infection.  Local treatment and outreach providers report that 
crack use and its attendant sex trade are the largest problems within the African American community, 
and that is where they target their HIV prevention efforts.  Outreach and education to IDUs, that was 
originally funded under federal grants, has since been reduced.  
 
Outreach 
 
In 1985 HIV counseling and testing (C&T) only targeted MSMs. It was not until the late 1980’s that 
C&T targeted other populations in Memphis. The state provided some funding for street based outreach 
in 1991.  But again, these efforts focused on MSMs. However neither gay men nor IDUs were ever 
explicitly targeted when state HIV funding was planned, debated and approved. State lawmakers were 
not willing to discuss issues of homosexuality or drug use when funds were issued.  They would only 
acknowledge the need for education to youth, women and the African American community.  As a result 
statewide planning and funding has never included any specific strategies for reaching IDUs.  Public 
health officials at the state level also avoided developing plans for working with IDUs.  They felt the 
populations were too difficult to reach, and they were not willing to openly discuss injection drug use. 
They were also uncertain how they could provide information to IDUs without violating drug 
paraphernalia and other narcotic related laws.  Community planning began in 1992 but had little effect 
on programs or funding for IDUs.  The HIV Prevention Planning Council also wrestled with the same 
issues as the legislatures and “realized the limitations of working with the IDU population”.  Community 
and state-wide planners ultimately decided to let “other agencies” provide services to IDUs, removing 
the State DOH from any controversy for enacting programs for IDUs.  
 
Staffed by DOH, street based outreach began targeting African American women of childbearing age 
and youth.  With the start of the community planning process, the DOH started to subcontract services 
with local CBOs. 
 
There was both a will among African American activists and a willingness on the part of the state and 
local health officials to focus on the African American community, rather than on specific behaviors 
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within and beyond that community that put them at risk.  Planners that focused on race alone, excluding 
a larger focus on IDUs or MSMs, realized that crack use, and sex trade related to crack use were the 
issues most impacting the African American community at that time.   
 
In 1988 a manager at the DOH convened a group of African American CBOs to apply for a cooperative 
grant from a federal agency for street outreach to IDUs. The cooperative included a community 
corrections agency that supervised non-violent offenders.  This CBO was responsible for the outreach 
component of the program, which also included HIV C&T. The CBO developed a street outreach 
program without a model.  They used surveillance teams to “map” high crime areas, looking for 
discarded paraphernalia and drug dealing activity.  They hired former IDUs as outreach workers and 
included two civil rights ministers on their staff that then provided them access to two churches.   The 
program included condom and bleach distribution, and education on safer sex. The outreach program 
was also able to use the church van to conduct outreach in different communities.   Some key churches 
opposed the program because it targeted African Americans, and because HIV was still considered a 
“gay disease” by many in the community.  Secondly they opposed the distribution of condoms and 
bleach kits as a means for encouraging immoral behavior.  
 
“Memphis is the Bible belt…and you’re talking about advocating safer sex practices.  They view 
that as an endorsement of out of wedlock sex and promiscuous activities…some people took it as 
a moral issue. Is it right to give people paraphernalia to have sex with? There was some concern 
from the community in regards to the outreach teams having a section that dealt with sterilizing 
paraphernalia that was promoting drug use.“ 
 
Conversely churches spent a great deal of time educating the public about “causal contagion.”  There 
was a great deal of fear in the community. Outreach workers had to provide copies of their presentations 
in advance to the church staff, and often “objectionable” parts were deleted by the staff. 
 
The participation of the DOH in the collaboration provided the program with credibility in the 
community.  However, within the higher levels of the DOH there was opposition to the outreach 
program.  Interviewees described them as “set in their ways”.  Some argued that it was not a good 
intervention, and at that time there was very little data available to support it.  The DOH administrators 
had low expectations of the street based outreach program.  In the cooperative agreement, the outreach 
component received the least amount of funding.  They suffered from high staff turn over among 
outreach workers because they were unable to pay higher salaries.  Lower level DOH staff understood 
and supported outreach programs; however they were severely understaffed.  There was only one person 
responsible for all community health education in Memphis. 
 
Their outreach efforts were welcomed in areas of high drug sales and prostitution, and in public housing 
projects with high crime rates.  They focused their activities there rather than on organizations that 
opposed them.  They educated the community block by block where they worked.  They recognized the 
need for a larger social marketing campaign to gain the support of the community, but there was no 
funding for this kind of a campaign.  
 
In 1991, funding for the outreach program was continued by another state agency.  The outreach 
program had been moved from one CBO to a new drug treatment agency started by African American 
providers.  Although the funding was targeted to African American IDUs, it provided outreach to non-
injectors as well.  The focus of the outreach program swiftly changed from IDUs to African American 
crack users and sex workers involved in crack use. The program decreased emphasis on information to 
IDUs and availability of bleach kits. Information was only offered upon request, and not to anyone 
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under the age of 18.  This was in response to both the predominance of crack and the opposition of the 
local community to safer injection messages. When asked about the program’s response to the 
opposition to safer injection education one interviewee responded. 
 
“When I came in they had pretty much decreased the part regarding education and even 
materials…‘cause at one time we had safer sex kits and the paraphernalia kit which included 
alcohol, cotton swabs and something else we’d use to clean the works.  There was a decrease in 
that.  It was made known that the outreach teams could educate you on that but it wasn’t part of 
the protocol.  It was only upon request.” 
 
In another interview a drug treatment provider reported there was virtually no AIDS prevention 
information available to Memphis IDUs, and no bleach distributed by any program. 
 
One drug treatment agency director was on the regional HIV Prevention Planning Council (HPPC). He 
supported the focus on crack use within the African American community.  The outreach program had 
worked closely with the local African American churches.  They are considered critical to gaining 
acceptance in a community and transmitting information and attitudes within the community.  They 
have found pastors who are accepting and work with them, but they must approach them carefully.  
They approached more progressive pastors and presented their program to them.  Outreach workers did 
their “street” presentations to pastors using graphic language.  They realized that was a mistake.   
 
“You can’t be smarter than the pastor. You must get him to accept it and bring it to the 
congregation.” 
 
The DOH also continues to offer outreach, education and HIV C&T to community groups in the jails.  
However, none of this outreach is targeted specifically to IDUs.  The state continues to be unwilling to 
target programs to MSMs or IDUs.  They repeatedly call for more funds for youth and women of 
childbearing age. 
 
Drug Treatment 
 
Until 1987, the Memphis DOH provided drug treatment through their own methadone clinic, including 
free treatment for those unable to pay. In 1987 the state cut funding for methadone programs.  The DOH 
clinic was closed and that same year a private, for-profit methadone program opened.  One respondent 
described this methadone program as  “evil and terrible because they don’t care about people.  They just 
want to make money.” They are the only private methadone provider. Recently two other methadone 
clinics have tried to open and met with opposition.  To date neither has been successful in receiving 
local approval.  Memphis has several other residential and outpatient drug treatment programs.  One 30-
bed residential treatment facility focused on the African American community also has the DOH 
contract to conduct the local HIV street based outreach program.  One former treatment director 
described the demographics of drug users in his program from 1990-2000 as approximately half IDUs.  
Dilaudid was the drug of choice, but over the last 6 years heroin use has risen with the increased purity 
of the drug on the street.  IDUs in his program tended to be white males with a median age of 25 years.  
He described the Hepatitis C epidemic in Memphis and said that 85 to 90% of people with Hepatitis C 
are IDUs.   
 
In the early 1990’s fraud was suspected in the state agency responsible for substance abuse services and 
the Bureau of Alcohol and Drug Use was transferred to the Tennessee Department of Health (DOH). 
One respondent commented: 
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“DOH did not want the program.  They were the bastard child of DOH. They did not try to get 
any funding or develop any new programs.” 
 
1992 was the peak of the crack epidemic in Memphis.  More treatment facilities were needed and there 
were no facilities that were focused on sensitive to the needs of African Americans.  African American 
drug treatment providers started a new community based drug treatment program with a grant from the 
Tennessee Bureau of Drugs and Alcohol.  This is the same program that runs the Memphis CBO based 
outreach program.  The treatment program included HIV education and case management for HIV-
positive clients.  Because the focus of the program is the African American community, the director felt 
injection drug use was not the most pressing problem in the community, but it was rather crack use and 
sexual risks related to crack use.  Outreach workers are trained to provide information about cleaning 
needles and safe injection but have more call to discuss safer sex issues.   
 
There was very little opposition to this program.  It was located in a very old African American 
community with a local pastor as a co-founder.  The program director stated that these kinds of 
programs must come from the community. To be successful, they must work with local opinion leaders 
and gain their support first. 
 
Treatment providers agreed that funding is more difficult to secure now.  There is virtually no grant 
funding available.  Funding comes through contracts with the state and is based on fees for services 
only.  The African American program receives funding through Tenn-Care (the state Medicaid system) 
for Tenn-Care eligible patients enrolled in the program.  However, these funds have been cut drastically.  
The program also receives clients mandated through the local drug diversion courts. One respondent felt 
that programs are run much more like businesses now than in the past and this might make it more 
difficult for new programs to start.  
 
Needle Exchange 
 
During the 1988 collaborative meeting, bleach kits were distributed and NEPs were discussed as a 
possible intervention. A DOH program manager tried to encourage others to apply for funding from a 
private foundation to start a NEP. However needle exchange was too controversial, and no one wanted 
to get involved and the issue died. One interviewee reported about that time and said, 
 
“I like my job.  I want to keep it.  So I am not going to talk about NEP.” 
 
Although there were some reports of underground NEPs in Memphis, researchers were unable to obtain 
any contact information or anyone who reported any direct knowledge of a NEP.  None of the 
respondents we interviewed thought NEP was a tenable option for Memphis. There was no single leader 
or group identified as “the opposition” to NEP.  The consensus of respondents was that Memphis was 
simply too conservative a community to ever accept NEP and that anyone who attempted to initiate such 
a program would immediately lose their job.  Unlike other cities that have tried and failed to implement 
an NEP, needle exchange in Memphis remains, as far as we can determine, untried.  None of the 
respondents reported any plans, discussions, or even hopes to implement an NEP in Memphis in the 
future.  
 
Because we felt it was critical to describe a NEP program operating in a conservative state we collected 
information from the Nashville NEP program.  The program is fairly well known, and is run out of a 
local African American church. 
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"In the environment there is always going to be the issues of dealing with the conservative 
voices.  But we’ve been able to get around that by not being adversarial and doing our work with 
a level of consistency that people respect who we are and what we do." 
 
In 1983 a local African American congregation became involved with IDUs and substance use issues. 
The church had a long history of involvement in public health issues, civil rights, poverty relief, and 
many other areas of community work.  Over time they became involved in the HIV/AIDS crisis. They 
believed the relationship between HIV and injection drug use within the community was clear.   In 1991 
they began distributing bleach kits to IDUs and began to explore the possibility of starting a NEP.  
 
In 1993 a woman who had been involved in organizing and working with NEP in New York moved to 
Nashville.  She wanted to begin an NEP in Nashville and began working with the church. In 1994 they 
began a small NEP program with their own funds, utilizing the church’s outreach services.  They 
quickly developed a collaborative application for a NEP with the local DOH to a private foundation.  
The grant was funded; however, the church ran into its first opposition before the funds could be 
received.  Because the DOH was involved, the city council had to approve the receipt of the funds.  It 
became clear that, while there were supporters on the council, when it came to a vote the funding would 
be rejected.  Even more importantly, the church did not want the issue to come to a full debate, causing 
various members of the council and other city health and law enforcement officials to take public stands 
against NEP.  They quietly withdrew the proposal.  They knew they would be able to gain tacit 
approvals and a “gentlemen’s agreement to look the other way” from various city officials if they did 
not force these officials to take a public stand.   It is under this “gentlemen’s agreement” that the NEP 
has successfully functioned illegally to this day in Nashville.    
 
"There is an understanding that as long as we are consistent with adhering to the protocols we 
have developed and shared with the powers that be, that we would be allowed to continue and 
not have to deal with any repercussions.  But it is clear that there are very conservative people in 
the community who would turn it into a public issue that would impede our being able to do the 
work if it became highly visible.  So we work hard at keeping it as low key as possible.  But every 
year we are doing more and more work." 
 
After withdrawing the collaborative proposal, the church made a decision then to keep the NEP a 
grassroots church-based program.  The church became the recipient of the foundation grant and was able 
to significantly expand their operation.  They developed a research component for the NEP in part to 
maintain the respect of the health and law enforcement officials. However, they believe that it is due to 
their reputation as a group that provides a wide variety of social services in poor communities that has 
been the most important factor in the acceptance of the NEP. 
 
"I think there was a lot of respect for the work that we do period.  Not that people always agree 
with us, but they respect and are not adversarial to us." 
 
The NEP has avoided media and other public exposure as much as possible; however it becomes more 
and more difficult as the volume of the exchange increases.  They provide referrals to HIV C&T, drug 
treatment and other services.  The NEP attracts many people into their services who they would not 
otherwise be able to reach.  All of the funding for the NEP comes from the congregation and private 
foundations.  They are very careful to ensure that funding they receive for their other services does not 
go into the NEP.  It has been difficult for them to maintain credibility with IDUs who are wary of 
official institutions and with local law enforcement, the DOH, and other city agencies. 
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The minister does a great deal of education among community members, other service providers and 
community leaders about NEP.  The church is beginning to have a few more allies especially among 
treatment providers who will speak out in favor of the NEP.  Because the church is involved in so many 
different community services and organizations, they are able to educate many other providers and 
activists.  The church points to the interrelationship between HIV, substance use, criminal justice, poor 
education and poverty to help others understand their work.  Their position as a religious institution is 
also critical to their stance on needle exchange and their acceptance within the community. 
 
“Depends upon who’s carrying the message and how it’s presented to the community.  I think 
you could have syringe exchange in Memphis.  I think the issue is who’s going to bring that to 
the table and I think that if indeed there were folks within the faith community advancing the 
initiative, then it would be accepted.  There aren’t many folks who are willing to use the 
language of the church as the way they justify doing syringe exchange.  I think that because we 
are a church and we have developed our rationale for doing what we do around our belief, I 
think then our language for the proposition is different from anyone who came advancing the 
idea on the basis of the science.  Because at some point people have to believe it’s the morally 
right thing to do.  Because even if the science is good, if people don’t believe in it, it doesn’t 
make any difference.”  
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MIAMI 
 
 
City Summary 
 
According to the CDC’s December 2000 HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report Miami has the highest rates of 
AIDS in the United States (CDC, 2000).  Miami’s unique mix of cultures has required HIV prevention 
efforts for drug users to encompass the many religious, political, linguistic, and community norms 
represented in the area. 
 
“The problem in the Latino community that we come across is that they’re a very close knit 
family.  It’s a problem.  They like to hide it within the family.  And so it’s harder to reach that 
community, because they will not let you know that there is a problem…Puerto Ricans have a 
culture of injecting much more than the Cubans do.  The choice of drugs and the preference for 
administration of the drugs are very culturally bound here.  And we have so many different Latin 
groups that you can’t view them as a homogenous group at all.  And the Hondurans are very 
different from either of those.  And then, of course, the other Caribbean populations, the 
Haitians are very different from the Hispanic groups and so on.  The diversity in our community 
makes it very difficult for the groups to get a voice.  Because there is such great need, and such 
great diversity, that it’s kind of difficult for each group to be heard.  And our politics are now 
dominated by a very conservative constituency."  
 
As many as 75% of new HIV infections in Miami are among persons who are substance users or in 
sexual contact with substance users (Holmberg, 1996).  The drugs of choice for the southern United 
States and Florida have been crack cocaine and heroin (Community Epidemiology Work Group, 1998). 
 
Poor people, women with a history of abuse or domestic violence, African-Americans, and Hispanics 
suffer high rates of HIV infection.  (Community Based Organizations Resources Network, 2000).  The 
epidemic in Miami-Dade County has shifted to increasingly impact poor and minority residents.  
African Americans carry a significant part of the disease burden, accounting for over 70% of IDU 
HIV/AIDS cases.  Latinos represent 16% of the disease burden among IDUs.  Injection drug use 
accounts for approximately 15% of the over 30,000 HIV and AIDS cases in Miami/Dade County. (It is 
important to note that for HIV and AIDS cases reported through February 2000, 10,144 (33%) were not 
attributed to any exposure category.  Some of these cases may be attributable to injection drug use.)  
 
Outreach 
 
HIV outreach to IDUs in Miami have largely come out of a research group affiliated a large state 
university in Miami, which conducts research among the five to ten thousand IDUs in the county.  The 
university received NADR funding to initiate street outreach to drug users in 1986.  Early ethnographic 
studies guided the design of street outreach efforts among IDUs.  Early outreach efforts consisted largely 
of education and bleach and condom distribution programs.  These efforts were eventually buttressed by 
Miami’s largest ASO when they began a street outreach program which distributed bleach, cottons, 
“cookers,” and condoms.  The DPH also conducts outreach to drug users.  This is largely done by 
funding drug treatment centers and contracting with ASOs. 
 
Successes that exist appear to stem from the ability of outreach workers, particularly those working from 
the university, to establish trust and credibility among drug users.  The base of success has been to 
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understand the culture of drug use and try to meet their immediate needs within the realm of HIV 
prevention.  The university earned respect and credibility among drug users by hiring former addicts and 
others who are familiar with the culture of drug use and the communities they are working in.  
 
One of the bigger challenges among outreach efforts for IDUs is the lack of continuity and 
institutionalization of proven services.  Many outreach efforts are carried out as research projects and are 
halted when funding runs out.  There appears to be a need to adopt outreach efforts that are shown to be 
effective, by either the public health department or CBOs.   
 
Local government and politicians have been reluctant to support prevention efforts among IDUs and 
have even criticized outreach activities.  The only recent local political support came in 2000 from the 
mayor’s wife, when she gave a strong supportive statement for the just issued assessment and evaluation 
of HIV among people of color saying that she would “keep the city on top of this and that HIV would no 
longer sit in the back room.”   
 
There appears to be little formal opposition to HIV outreach efforts for IDUs. The Catholic Church in 
Miami is the most prominent opponent given its past opposition to the distribution of bleach and 
condoms.  With the high prevalence of Catholics among Latinos, this message carries tremendous 
weight in Miami’s Latino community.   
 
The police offered some early resistance to bleach and condom distribution since these efforts were seen 
as drug paraphernalia.  Subsequent meetings allowed an understanding of who the outreach workers 
were and what they are doing to be communicated to the police and alleviate further confrontations.   
 
There are several groups working to stop the use of drugs, advocate for drug treatment and support a 
strong criminal justice system, but their efforts do not appear to undermine outreach efforts.   
 
Drug Treatment 
 
"Miami’s no different than any other community.  I mean, originally HIV planning councils were 
comprised predominantly of gay men, white gay men.  Then as the disease changed, and as more 
services needed to be provided, and more CBOs that represented specific minority groups 
became more relevant in the planning process, that’s when actually substance abuse treatment 
started to get a little more visibility.  Because, it wasn’t the white gay community using 
residential substance abuse treatment.  It was the African American men and women, the Latin 
men and women, you know, the homeless, the agencies that service people that were homeless.  
So, I mean, and recently substance abuse wasn’t considered an issue, because it wasn’t -- 
because the type of person that uses substance abuse treatment doesn’t fit your typical profile of 
what a board member would’ve been like ten years ago. 
 
The first evidence of HIV infection among IDUs first appeared in Miami around 1985.  During the early 
days of the epidemic, from the mid 1980’s to about 1996, the primary prevention strategy was to get 
IDUs to stop using drugs.  In 1993 the state of Florida provided funding for substance abuse prevention 
and drug treatment block grants.  This funding allowed for pre and post test counseling for IDUs as well 
as a vehicle for bringing people into treatment.  As people with AIDS began to access the services 
funded by Ryan White, it was realized that substance abuse treatment was a pertinent area.  Substance 
abuse currently is the most heavily funded priority category through Ryan White in Miami.   
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In 1994 residential and out patient treatment programs were started for people with HIV. Respondents 
reported that before then HIV positive drug users were not always allowed into treatment programs.  
Apparently the treatment community was not very sympathetic to having HIV-positive individuals in 
treatment.   It was related to the fact that these people had more medical conditions as well as dealing 
with the stigma of having HIV-positive clients in their programs.   
 
It appears that new programs are more receptive to treating HIV positive clients.  But there are 
apparently some programs that will not apply for Ryan White funding for residential treatment because 
they do not want to serve HIV-positive clients.   
 
In 1999 there was an increase in HIV early intervention funding that provided outreach to IDUs and 
encouraged them to get tested before going into a treatment program. There have been HIV 
collaborations between the university and county agencies on activities that overlap, including outreach 
activities.   
 
Funding for services drives many of the programs that are implemented.   A substance abuse and mental 
health committee reviews all funding recommendations.  There is a clear understanding of the different 
agencies that it is important to include the various players in the planning of services for IDUs.  Support 
has been provided by the state drug czar’s office by including goals about risk reduction and harm 
reduction.   
 
The Department of Children and Families which authorizes who gets accepted into a state funded 
residential drug treatment program, has been able to monitor that certain racial or ethnic groups have not 
been excluded from services.  It was expressed that in the past providers were choosing individuals who 
they wanted in the programs, and that African-Americans were often excluded.  There currently is some 
concern that with the governor’s desire to increase the capacity of some community agencies and in turn 
reduce the role of governmental agencies, service providers will exclude certain racial groups and the 
homeless from treatment programs.  Three providers in the Miami area currently provide methadone 
services.   
 
Needle Exchange 
 
“…Needle exchange is where the dividing line is drawn.  I think they see it as something that 
should not happen...that it’s aiding drug use.  …I think that we’re even a more conservative 
community than the national community is.” 
 
NEP in Miami is yet another part of the puzzle of services provided or not provided to prevent HIV 
transmission among IDUs.  All current NEP activities in the Miami area appear to be very independent 
and have a very limited ability to reach a significant number of IDUs.  Each effort can hardly be termed 
a “program” but do fit a traditional grassroots model.  The more active individual provider, who 
independently operates an exchange in the Homestead area, has received funding from a national needle 
exchange network and condoms from the DPH.  He exchanges about 300 needles a month.  There have 
been NEP efforts in central Miami up through 1999 but they have recently ceased.  
 
There appears to be a sense of fear or unwillingness to “rock the boat” among people working with the 
drug-using community with regard to setting up a NEP.  Needle exchange is not legal in the state of 
Florida as it is illegal to possess, distribute or sell drug paraphernalia.  Researchers at the university are 
careful to stay within the legal system to work with drug users, conducting outreach, distributing bleach, 
condoms, and related paraphernalia but do not get involved in trying to implement NEP.  There have 
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been lobbying efforts from faculty at the university to try and have statutes changed.  But to date these 
efforts have been unsuccessful.  The university receives money from the state and federal government 
and the Miami/Dade DOH. and they are not willing to jeopardize their relationships to begin conducting 
NEPs.   
 
Within the DPH it is less clear why there have not been large efforts to promote NEP.  The most 
commonly heard reason is because it is not legal.  But this has been the case in other cities, and things 
have changed after a few people promoted NEPs.  There is a reluctance that seems to go deeper than 
legal reasons.  
 
Additionally, the local government is considered very conservative and not supportive of HIV 
prevention activities among drug users.  The fact that Miami’s mayor is of Cuban descent and the city 
council is made up entirely of Latinos may be a factor when one considers the often-heard statement that 
Latinos are silent about HIV/AIDS.   
 
“I think that we have a very conservative government here relative to HIV prevention.  We’ve 
needed better access to needles or syringes for a long time…the government still does not 
support those efforts.” 
 
The HPPC seriously considered implementing a NEP when they debated declaring an HIV state of 
emergency.  However, the “cure” for AIDS in the form of the new AIDS “cocktails” appears to have 
railroaded these efforts.  
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NEWARK 
 
 
City Summary 
 
“We’re not in the 21st century in this city. We’re a third world town. We’re a third World City 
when it comes to AIDS and when it comes to drug use, it’s a third World City. One of the 
greatest difficulties here is that drugs are the probably the second largest employer in the city of 
Newark. And everybody is involved in the drug trade. This is the economics of the city of 
Newark...The hardest barrier to overcome is the general citizen’s belief that drug use is about a 
person not having enough character—not being strong enough—being weak, and that HIV is 
punishment, and not a world health pandemic.” 
 
Newark has the sixth highest AIDS rate in the country. There is a prevalent myth in Newark that drug 
users in their town do not inject their drugs despite the fact that injection drug use accounts for over 60% 
of all HIV/AIDS cases (New Jersey HIV Prevention Community Planning Group 1998).  Heroin use in 
Newark has been on the rise since 1991 among all ethnic groups and across all age groups (Mammo 
2000) despite a decrease in the use of other substances. Heroin injection did begin to decrease during the 
early 1990’s but the CEWG reported a small, but steady increase starting in the mid 1990’s especially 
among the 18 to 34 year olds and especially among Whites and Hispanics. There is also a rise in the 
number of senior African Americans injecting heroin. The purity of heroin has risen and the price has 
sharply decreased since 1997 (Mammo 2000) in Newark. 
 
Respondents complained that there are very old-fashioned attitudes about drug users in Newark, almost 
an “Old Testament quality”. “They are bad people who are sinning and who deserve what they get.” 
They also complained that there is little understanding of what constitutes “harm reduction.” 
 
Outreach 
 
Outreach to IDUs was first funded in 1988 with federal research demonstration grants to the state 
Department of Health to designated cities in NJ, including Newark. Indigenous community health 
outreach workers (CHOWs) were hired from Newark to provide AIDS education and prevention in their 
communities. The model of hiring recovering addicts, often from therapeutic communities or methadone 
drug treatment programs was quickly accepted and implemented in Newark. Many types of CHOW 
programs were funded by both the city and the state to units in the Newark Department of Health and 
Human Services, CBOs, drug treatment programs, and churches.  
 
There is a considerable amount of outreach dollars allocated to Newark, although there seems to be a lot 
of confusion among the outreach service providers as to who is actually providing AIDS education and 
prevention in the community. One CBO director said her program was the first in 1994, but then they 
lost funding until 1996. They did some limited outreach in 1997 and then a received a large federal grant 
in 1999.  At the time of the interview (1/01) she believed that “her program was the only program 
funded to do street outreach other than some church groups that provided food and clothing.” When 
asked if they knew what happened to the CHOWs who were funded in 1988, they replied, 
 
“I have absolutely no idea. I know the city of Newark itself has tried to do some outreach and 
has stopped. As far as I know, they’re not doing any outreach.” 
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There was not sufficient data to confirm or deny this perspective or to develop a clear picture of the 
relationships between CBOs and the Department of Health and Human Services. 
 
Several outreach program directors had never heard of “CHOWs.” One CBO director believed that 
“none of those other programs were ever out there,” and that if they were providing any street outreach 
services, workers would only go to selected sites that they considered safe. They did not want to go into 
any abandoned buildings, particularly the boarded-up public housing projects that have been “squatted” 
for years, or along the railroad tracks, or some of the container trailers that are used by drug users. 
 
Bleach kits and condoms were distributed early on as part of the outreach protocol, but respondents 
reported that they have not been readily accessible to the most at risk populations. Hiring, retention, 
supervision, and training were singled out as barriers to mounting effective outreach programs. Drug use 
in Newark has been described as one “big hot spot” with very few “cold spots.” Therefore it is very 
difficult for CHOWs to saturate any one area thoroughly. Burn-out, lack of leadership, lack of 
coordination within agencies and between agencies, and a sense of helplessness as to accomplishing 
HIV prevention within the context of the political and historical forces pervaded many of the 
interviewees. 
 
Another health department respondent spoke of the challenges of hiring qualified outreach staff. The 
outreach program primarily attracts women as the ones who want to do the outreach but they believed 
that there are spots where they can’t send women because it is too dangerous. Another hiring and staff 
retention issue is work place drug testing. Qualified potential CHOWS from the target areas cannot be 
hired because they test positive for heroin or cocaine. The people who are willing to go to those areas 
late at night when it is possible to reach the most people are the ones who are still engaged in that 
lifestyle. Or as one respondent put it “Who else would you find to do that work?” 
 
Drug Treatment 
 
Newark was at the forefront of developing innovative drug treatment programs in response to the AIDS 
epidemic among IDUs. In the late 1980’s, CHOWs distributed methadone detox treatment coupons. 
There was some initial opposition to the idea of using money as an incentive to get people into 
treatment. The program was quite successful, but suffered from funding problems and was discontinued 
in the early 1990’s.   
 
Patient Incentive Programs (PIP) now operate at high volume drug treatment centers.  PIP provides non-
financial incentives such as clothing to participants who remain in treatment. But the program has been 
reduced from 180 days to 45 days to accommodate the funding cycles of treatment facilities and to 
increase retention. One CBO respondent believes that clients sell their vouchers or incentives whenever 
possible.  There has been a struggle to convince funders that it is appropriate to use AIDS prevention 
dollars to fund drug treatment, but the funding for this program is currently steady, although the number 
of slots available for Newark is small and there is a two-week waiting list. 
  
HRSA funding has allowed for the development of targeted, multi-service programs to be established by 
several CBOs. One-stop shops, open during evening and weekend hours, provide a range of drug 
treatment and psycho-social services to several different target populations (e.g., homeless, drug-using 
women, men who have sex with men, etc.). These types of programs call for formal coalitions between 
agencies to provide different components of the services. Some respondents thought that the programs 
worked well together while others thought that was certainly not the case for their agency. 
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“There’s a lack of cooperation here. We are a very poor city, and everybody is at everybody 
else’s throat to get money. I don’t get any money from either the city, the county or the state. I’ve 
been cut out by all three. I only get federal money. So, in a sense, it’s easy for me to look at it, 
and see the complete lack of cooperation, pathetic as it is…people going for the same bucks, and 
it’s just murderously difficult to get them, and so, there’s a general lack of cooperation.” 
 
Despite these innovations, Newark drug treatment suffers from a variety of problems as identified by the 
respondents. One claimed that there are sufficient treatment slots in Newark, but the reputation of the 
services as perceived in the community keeps people from utilizing many programs. People “will go to 
East Orange before they would enroll in one of the programs in Newark.” 
 
Even among savvy service providers, myths about how certain programs treat IDUs negatively and what 
they make them do or not do abound. One respondent laughed when asked what she knew about another 
drug treatment program. 
 
"One of my clients told me last week that he wasn’t going to X program because ‘I’m not putting 
on no dress…’ It seems when a client has broken a rule, that they have been known to make the 
client, male client, put on a dress and walk down the main street of town. A kind of homophobia 
of Newark and of individuals." 
 
When asked if she had checked out this rumor with the agency in question, she laughed.  
 
Another myth about drug treatment in Newark is that programs have “waiting lists” and “empty beds. 
When asked how this could be so, a director replied: 
 
“Well, the question is, how do you have both? And one of our staff followed up on it, and found 
out that they were not taking people unless there’d been insurance clearances. This is about 
money.” 
 
One CBO director, when asked what they knew about innovative drug treatment as an AIDS prevention, 
replied  
 
 “Everything has just gone into methadone clinics. And not every IDU wants to go on methadone. 
In Newark, there’s a very strong perception among IDUs that methadone is just another drug, 
and they do not want to be on it.” 
 
Needle Exchange 
 
Needles are very scarce in Newark and can cost as much as $5 on the street. Needles are sharpened on 
matchbooks and used over and over again until they wear out. We were told that discarded syringes are 
never found on the street, the railroad tracks, alleyways, etc., and that IDUs do not know about cleaning 
syringes with bleach. No one we interviewed knew of any drug users who utilized New York NEPs on a 
regular basis if at all.  
 
No one we interviewed had ever heard of any kind of illegal needle exchange program ever operating in 
Newark. As of May, 2001 there is still no evidence of any underground needle exchange efforts in the 
city.  When asked to comment on the possibility of the implementation of needle exchange one 
interviewee replied, 
 
Downing/Des Jarlais/Edlin Community Acceptance Final Report 
 Submitted January 2002 
 31
…Politically that [needle exchange] is not going to happen anytime soon… A woman presented 
information on needle exchange…City Council members laughed at the idea…Politicians in 
Newark are in denial. 
 
A New York City AIDS activist organization opened an office in New Jersey in order to launch a 
“statewide public education campaign designed to build awareness about needle exchange and to 
develop consensus among the leadership of the most hard-hit communities in support of needle 
exchange.” This group believed that there was “substantial constituency support for needle exchange 
that has never been mobilized” (Lanier, 1999). They worked with other NJ cities including Newark to 
get local resolutions passed to approve needle exchange if the state ban were lifted.  Activists from the 
group made a presentation to the Newark City Council and gained the support of several council 
members. However, one interviewee criticized the organizers because  
 
“They weren’t the right people for the job. They came in with their own agenda. What the 
agenda should have been was to educate people to make up their own minds, and letting people 
see what their own prejudices, preconceptions, etc are…They had a forum and it didn’t work 
because they didn’t understand the local culture. They had a white boy from New York…and you 
can’t do that in Newark, it doesn’t work…You have to be very sensitive to what the issues are 
locally. It just wasn’t one of their better moves.”  
 
The CARE Council in Newark and some local church groups passed resolutions in support of the 
ordinances, but the campaign was not successful in Newark as it was in other cities in the state. 
Eventually the group ran out of funding and closed their New Jersey office.  
 
One respondent when asked if they thought the injection rate was low in Newark and that’s why there 
was no push for needle exchange said 
 
“Well, that’s interesting because even if there were one person injecting, that would be a good 
reason for an exchange. It’s not about numbers.” 
 
Aside from the usual arguments against needle exchange, such as that it promotes drug use, another 
interviewee noted that the strong hold of African American churches on the government and the general 
community prevents needle exchange from being implemented in the city.   However this remains to be 
an issue of much debate.  When asked to comment on what role the African American churches might 
play in keeping needle exchange from becoming implemented an interviewee remarked,  
 
“…I think that’s a bogus explanation, whenever they say it can’t be done in Newark that’s when 
they point to the fact that established Black churches would be offended but I think that is a 
convenient excuse that just doesn’t hold any water.” 
 
Of all the reasons surrounding the lack of implementation of needle exchange in Newark, all the 
interviewees unanimously agreed that the political climate successfully prevents groups or individuals 
from starting underground NEPs.  Stories of activists in another New Jersey city being “locked up” and 
all their possessions confiscated spread to Newark, intimidating all those who wanted to start an 
underground effort. The effort to establish a NEP in Newark has been abandoned.  The founder of the 
other New Jersey exchange was interviewed and denied that anyone lost their house or possessions. 
They were upset that this rumor was used as an excuse for people not to start a NEP in Newark or 
anywhere else in the state. 
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Only one respondent talked about clean syringes being available from certain medical providers at the 
local hospitals or clinics. However, that person also admitted that not many high-risk individuals could 
access syringes via this method.  
 
“There is a particular doctor, who most of us know at one of the local hospitals, who is very 
loose about ‘scripts. He will ‘script for almost anything. And he does give ‘scripts for needles, 
supposedly…” 
 
Another agency director said that three years ago they were asked if they wanted to distribute 10,000 
syringe kits. The outreach staff really wanted to do it, and they discussed it at length. 
 
“We’re a small agency with so many funding problems, that we just couldn’t undertake to do an 
illegal needle exchange. We didn’t have the kind of back up that we would need to do it, so we 
did not do it.” 
 
The former governor made her position on needle exchange very clear early in her administration. 
Numerous letters (Whitman 1996) and editorials (Whitman, 1998) and personal communications via her 
staff, have firmly outlined her opposition to any kind of needle exchange program. In a communiqué 
dated December 26, 2000, shortly before she left office, the governor’s aide wrote the following to us: 
 
“…After reviewing the recommendations of her Advisory Council on AIDS, the Governor 
remains firmly opposed to such programs….she believes policy that directly or indirectly 
encourages illegal drug use is irresponsible.” 
 
The acting governor as of this date maintains the same position. Several respondents were contacted at 
the end of May to provide an update on the status of needle exchange in Newark. Some of their 
responses when asked if they had heard of any attempts to establish any kind of harm reduction or 
needle exchange programs in Newark were “Sadly, the answer from me is still no.” and “ I do not know 
of anything NEPs or distribution activities in Newark.” The future of needle exchange in New Jersey is 
not even being considered at this time. 
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SEATTLE 
 
 
City Summary 
 
“Seattle’s experience was pretty smooth and featured an awful lot of cooperation.” 
 
As of June 2001 there were 6,246 cumulative AIDS cases reported for King County, of which Seattle is 
part.  However, the health department estimates that between 6,000 and 9,000 residents of the county are 
currently infected with HIV (Seattle and King County Department of Public Health, 1999). 
 
The Seattle and King County Department of Public Health estimates between 10,000 and 25,000 drug 
injectors in the county.  Prevalence of AIDS cases IDUs has remained low.  As of July 1998, 286 IDU 
cases were reported, (not including MSM IDUs), representing 5% of all King County’s AIDS cases.  
This is five times fewer the proportion of AIDS cases attributed to IDUs in the US.  MSM IDUs account 
for 10% of cumulative AIDS cases in King County.  (Seattle and King County Department of Public 
Health, 1999) HIV prevention advocates and public health officials have pointed to these low rates as 
evidence of the success of early interventions among IDUs in Seattle.  They have pointed to the much 
higher rates among IDUs in other US cities as a warning of what could happen if interventions were not 
initiated and maintained.  
 
In 1983, long before such planning councils were mandated under the Ryan White CARE Act, Seattle 
developed a community advisory council for HIV and AIDS spending. Within a few years, IDUs and 
drug treatment providers were represented on this council. Their presence was influential in gaining 
support and coordinating services for HIV prevention for IDUs. 
 
Outreach 
  
“Seattle was relatively unique in that there was agreement among several key players from the 
start that outreach was crucial…and there was a fair amount of cooperation and collaboration 
between those different agencies.” 
 
In the mid-1980’s, before any official discussion of prevention for IDUs had occurred, the AIDS 
Prevention Program (APP) of Seattle and King County Public Health Department started a bleach 
distribution program in their building. Their offices were housed across the hall from methadone 
program and APP staff felt compelled to do something for IDUs they saw every day entering that 
program.  From this beginning, a bleach and pamphlet distribution program slowly expanded to include 
local bars, shelters, drug treatment centers, and other drop-off sites. There were no outreach workers 
assigned to this until much later; it was a volunteer effort within APP. 
 
In 1985, APP collaborated with the alcohol and drug research group at the local university to conduct an 
ethnographic study of IDUs.  Ethnographers became the first informal “outreach workers.”  They started 
distributing bleach, condoms, and information because they felt it needed to be done.  
 
“There was a lot of spillover of function and role and so on.  It was just a bunch of people trying 
to address a problem, and there was a feeling you couldn’t just go out and be an ethnographer 
and kind of stand there and ask people questions and observe their risk behavior without offering 
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something, without doing something both because it was a moral injunction and, second, 
because as any ethnographer knows, reciprocity is the name of the game.”  
 
Upon returning from the International AIDS Conference in Amsterdam in 1987, the APP director 
formed a committee within the health department to examine the feasibility of implementing 
interventions for IDUs that had been used in other countries. He held a meeting of all Seattle agencies 
interested in and working with IDUs. Representatives from the health department, police, universities, 
drug treatment centers, health maintenance organizations (HMOs), ASOs, and CBOs discussed 
strategies and prioritized them. Outreach was considered the most beneficial and feasible of all the 
interventions. Interested parties continued to meet and formed the collaboration that eventually became 
part of the national AIDS research project. 
 
Throughout the next several years the APP director and his colleagues met repeatedly with internal 
opponents, community groups, and city and county officials. They presented reviews of data supporting 
the interventions, tried to humanize IDUs as part of the Seattle community and pointed to the rising rates 
of infection among IDUs in other parts of the US.  They described their strategy as never forcing anyone 
into a polarized position by asking them to approve or disapprove of the interventions. Rather than 
“winning” the debate ultimately one respondent said, “we wore them down with information and 
persistence.”   
 
The national AIDS research project began in March of 1989, with two of the ethnographers who had 
been doing “unofficial” outreach hired as outreach workers.  The Outreach Coordinator (OC) was also 
an ethnographer who had worked in Tacoma establishing their IDU outreach and NEP.  The project 
opened a storefront research center in a neighborhood with a lot of drug use.  At the same time, Seattle 
AIDS activists started a NEP in the same neighborhood, working closely with APP and outreach 
workers.  The OC became the liaison between the city and the volunteer NEP.  
 
In November 1990, two years before the federal funding was to end, the outreach workers worked with 
others to form an independent non-profit to continue their work. They did not want the outreach 
program to become a part of the health department, feeling they would become too bound by city and 
county policies and restrictions. 
 
“It became clear to of a variety of us here in Seattle that the Feds were going to do what they 
always do: provide money for a few years and, once you actually get the thing up and running 
and proving that it’s working, pull the money.  So, in November of 1990, a group of people, both 
those involved in the project and those completely unaffiliated with the project, got together and 
decided to start an independent non-profit in hopes that we would be able to hit the ground 
running as soon as the NIDA funding ran out.” 
 
In 1992 when the federal funding ended, the new CBO received funding in the form of grants, city 
contracts, and donations to continue their outreach and HIV prevention work with IDUs.  In 1997 they 
took over two volunteer-run needle exchange sites. The two new sites were in neighborhoods where 
needle exchange was more controversial and the city’s process of coalition building to develop new 
NEP sites was too slow. 
 
Currently, the CBO conducts outreach, operates needle exchange sites and provides a drop-in center 
seeing over 300 people a day. The center offers referrals and assistance with drug treatment, housing, 
food, and clothing vouchers, and hosts AA, NA, women’s support group, and English and Spanish-
language user meetings.  
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Eighty-five percent of the CBO’s current funding comes from contracts with the city. The benefit to this 
is stable funding and the ability to work with a relatively liberal health department. Yet, they still feel 
somewhat impeded by the bureaucracy of a governmental agency that must respond to elected officials. 
However, funding through other sources has been difficult to find.  In addition they are under renewed 
pressure to relocate by local business groups as the downtown area has gentrified over the last decade. 
 
Drug Treatment 
 
One private, non-profit methadone clinic in particular has worked very closely with the APP. The 
leadership of it’s director in collaborating with the APP, and the HIV HPPC was seen as key to 
curtailing opposition among the local drug treatment providers toward interventions for IDUs.  
 
In 1989 an early collaboration between the Health Department and local methadone providers, the 
Integrated Services Project, placed primary care physicians in Seattle drug treatment centers and 
provided methadone vouchers to primary care providers in local community health centers.  The 
voucher system soon became widely used in the NEP, as a way to link NEP clients to drug treatment.  
Ryan White, the State and the HPPC have provided funding for the vouchers. 
 
In 1993, a collaboration between an outpatient treatment center serving gay men and APP began.  This 
project is unique in that it combines peer-based outreach in bars and social venues, secondary needle 
exchange by outreach workers in those venues, and outpatient drug treatment.  It is also one of the only 
programs for MSM IDUs in the country.  While staff members at the drug treatment center were wary of 
this program at first, APP provided harm reduction training to the staff.  Now the treatment center 
provides on-site needle exchange as well and is thought to be one of the first drug treatment centers to 
embrace harm reduction.  
 
In 1995, the methadone program that had worked most closely with APP expanded from one clinic to 
two. The agency now serves 900 IDUs in Seattle. They have encountered some resistance to the 
expansion of their programs by both the city and county councils. Many restrictions were placed on 
methadone programs because of community fears of drug users “hanging out” in the surrounding 
neighborhoods. Each clinic was limited to 350 clients, and the effort to expand to a new site encountered 
a great deal of “NIMBY” opposition.  
 
In 1999, the program expanded again to include a mobile methadone treatment program. The mobile 
program was adopted as a way to expand services without having to battle neighborhood opposition to 
additional fixed sites. The methadone van parks outside the community health centers. Although there 
was trepidation on the part of some health centers to participate, most concerns were relieved by 
providing a security guard with the van. 
 
The van serves several communities in King County, providing more accessibility to C&T and NEPs. 
The program also links methadone clients to the county health care system. The van’s drug counselors 
work with both the methadone patients and the health centers’ patients and staff. Counselors are given 
offices in the health centers and are available to the clinics’ staff and patients for assessments, 
consulting, and counseling. Through these relationships, the drug counselors are able to give their 
methadone patients direct referrals to providers in the health centers for primary health care.  
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While most developments among the drug treatment community have been positive, there is some 
concern about the transfer of alcohol and substance abuse services to the health services department. 
Respondents felt the move resulted in a reduction of resources for the division. 
 
“I think the detriments of this move are becoming increasingly clear to most service providers, 
and certainly to most public health practitioners…Now we are in separate departments – [with] 
competing agendas—competing for resources.” 
 
Needle Exchange 
 
There was opposition to the idea of NEP within both the health department and drug treatment agencies. 
The APP director and the OC held many briefings with health department officials and city council 
members to support NEP. As there was little scientific evidence on the effectiveness of NEP at this 
point, it was advocated as a way to make contact with IDUs and get them connected with services. The 
APP director and OC also pointed to high rates of HIV infection among IDUs in East Coast cities, 
emphasizing that Seattle’s low rates could skyrocket without intervention.  Careful never to back their 
opposition into a corner by forcing them to make a decision to actively support or oppose the 
interventions, they simply kept the meetings and conversations going. They finally “wore down” the 
opposition through persistence and a sense of urgency arising from increased national press coverage of 
HIV infection among IDUs at the time. 
 
At the 1987 International AIDS Conference in Amsterdam, national experts presented information on 
interventions being used around the U.S. to prevent HIV among IDUs. Representatives from the health 
department, police, university, drug treatment centers, HMOs, and ASOs discussed different strategies 
and prioritized them. NEP came out at the bottom of the list because it was viewed as politically 
unviable. 
 
In 1988, an AIDS activist organization was started in Seattle. This group was somewhat unique because 
it included experienced organizers not only from mainstream gay activism, the social-justice movement, 
gay Republican leaders, and civil libertarians, as well as current and former IDUs involved in social 
services for drug users. Most members had a decade or so of organizing experience. They used this 
experience to establish coalitions, work with local authorities and handle the media.  These actions were 
ultimately the key to the successful start-up and maintenance of the NEP.  
 
In the fall of 1988, a local activist started a NEP in Tacoma, inspiring Seattle AIDS activists to form a 
subcommittee to plan their own NEP. They met with Tacoma and  
San Francisco activists and set a start date.  In the spring of 1989, the activists contacted APP, stating 
that Seattle needed an NEP. APP replied that the health department would need approvals from the 
Mayor, city council, county council, and police department.  
 
“[The activists] said, ‘You do what you need to do. But you do it fast. In the meantime, we are 
going to start a NEP.’” 
 
Though APP staff had already begun this process, the imminent start date of the exchange moved 
everything into high gear. They met with the city council, chief of police, and the mayor. The political 
savvy of both the APP staff and the AIDS activists was instrumental in “working the system” and 
gaining approvals.  
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The activists networked with other NEP activists on the West Coast and learned a valuable lesson about 
community opposition, especially within the African-American community, and how it could impede 
NEP efforts. Therefore, they sought endorsements from popular, high profile African American 
community leaders, among others. They encountered no resistance to the program in this community. 
 
“Part of the task was to convince people within the health department that needle exchange was 
a reasonable thing to do…and that was a slow process, a very slow and difficult process. God 
knows where it would have gone if not for the activists ...What they did was to galvanize the 
health department, force it into a situation in which it had to do something, you know, fish or cut 
bait…the health department organized this meeting with the head of the health department, the 
head of the police department, and some of the local representatives…and members of the 
activist group all together in one big meeting to talk about what was going to happen and how 
we're all gonna handle this, and do so politely. In advance of that meeting, the health department 
was able to get the police convinced that this was a public health issue, and not a police 
enforcement issue. And so, they promised that whatever the health department decided was the 
right thing to do, they would support, and they would not go out of their way to harass the needle 
exchange.”  
 
On March 22, 1989, the Seattle NEP began. The AIDS activists had only a few hundred dollars they had 
raised and a small amount of syringes. APP and the outreach workers contributed condoms, bleach, 
literature, and referral materials.  Police were informed of the date of the first exchange, but not its exact 
location. A few press members were invited to come and do a story with volunteers at the site a few 
hours before it opened. Press had to be gone when exchange actually began. The NEP received positive 
press. The activists and the outreach workers had spread the word about the NEP among IDUs, and they 
were able to gain trust and acceptance among the IDUs quickly. 
 
Once the press on the new NEP came out, the Washington State Pharmacists Association announced that 
they wanted to donate the syringes. By its third month, the NEP was succeeding beyond the activists’ 
capacity to sustain it, and the city stepped in to assume its continuation. Encouraged by the lack of 
negative press or public opposition to the program, health department officials convinced the city and 
county councils that, since the program was going to happen anyway, it would be best if they had 
control of it. The APP established funding through the mayor’s office and took over the NEP.  
 
The NEP operated with city-funded outreach workers and volunteers. The following year, additional 
funding from the county was granted. The OC became the NEP coordinator. The city established a 
methadone voucher program, providing treatment for NEP clients. The city-funded NEP had a full-time 
staff person making referrals to drug treatment programs, tracking openings, and keeping waiting lists.  
 
The activists had not planned on having the city take over the exchange so quickly. They had assumed 
that they would continue to run it on a volunteer basis for many years. In retrospect, NEP activists would 
have preferred to have kept the organization separate, with funding from the health department, rather 
than have it become a health department program. Then they would have retained the ability to make 
decisions. The health department was seen as too slow to open new sites, and seemed not to put 
sufficient effort into developing new volunteers. Activists felt an independent NEP could have lobbied 
against police harassment more strongly.  
 
There was little organized opposition to the NEP. Despite official police approval of the NEP, there was 
occasional opposition from precinct captains. Police harassed and sometimes arrested NEP clients. The 
police would often stand right next to NEP table, and they would give NEP volunteers jaywalking 
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tickets. One NEP director had to go to court 15 times for jaywalking. NEP workers kept a log of the 
harassment incidences, including the badge numbers of the officers involved, and were in contact with a 
local police accountability organization. Finally, a new police chief was appointed who supported the 
NEP and discouraged harassment. 
 
The State Supreme Court ruled that needle exchange was legal and appropriate on two grounds: 1) the 
Washington State Omnibus Bill passed by the House and Senate clearly allowed for NEPs; and 2) the 
Washington State Constitution assigned broad powers which overrode other sanctions of statutory law 
allowing public health officers to do whatever they felt was necessary to contain the spread of 
communicable disease in their jurisdictions.  
 
Whereas volunteers liked conducting a sidewalk exchange, a survey of clients found that they preferred 
to be off the street, in an inconspicuous spot. Thus, the downtown exchange was moved into a small 
storefront. The downtown site is now open six days a weeks, four-and-a-half hours a day. They 
exchange 60-70,000 syringes a month, seeing 300-350 individuals in a typical afternoon. The downtown 
storefront is very small, which limits their ability to add new programs. The NEP now maintains a drug 
treatment waiting list of 600 people and follows them for a year to get them into treatment. They offer 
HIV and hepatitis testing and maintain an abscess clinic. 
 
In choosing new NEP sites, the city goes through a careful process of talking to all local stakeholders, 
both IDU and non-IDU. They conduct formative research with local users to design the site, then go to 
neighborhood and business association meetings.  They have contracted some sites to other CBOs who 
have circumvented this process.  Among CBOs there has been some frustration with the time the city 
takes to establish new sites. 
 
”When the city has gone to a new site, I can’t think of a site they’ve opened in less than a year. 
They go in and they talk to everybody, they talk to the barbershops, they talk to the restaurants, 
they talk to the bars, they talk to the neighbors. And what that’s meant is that they’ve been able 
to open each new site with a relative minimum amount of controversy and no press. But the NEP 
in the U District and the one on Capitol Hill were done independently because the city was just 
going to take way, way too long to move.” 
 
While over two-thirds of the county residents supported NEP in a survey, “NIMBY” sentiments 
prevents it from expanding. The downtown area has gentrified and now includes a new, upscale 
shopping area on one side and a tourist attraction on the other. The NEP is right in the middle. They are 
unable to find any other location for the downtown exchange.  
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